Early German Romanticism sought to respond to a comprehensive sense of spiritual crisis that characterised the late eighteenth century. The study demonstrates how the Romantics sought to bring together the new post-Kantian idealist philosophy with the inheritance of the realist Platonic-Christian tradition. With idealism they continued to champion the individual, while from Platonism they took the notion that all reality, including the self, participated in absolute being. This insight was expressed, not in the language of theology or philosophy, but through (...) aesthetics, which recognised the potentiality of all creation, including artistic creation, to disclose the divine. In explicating the religious vision of Romanticism, this study offers a new historical appreciation of the movement, and furthermore demonstrates its importance for our understanding of religion today. (shrink)

This volume consists of 21 essays on Marsilio Ficino (1433-99), the Florentine scholar-philosopher-magus-priest who was the architect of Renaissance Platonism.

The question of meaning entered sociology from the beginning. It is at issue with Marx’s theory of alienation and Weber’s method Verstehen. It was also at issue in the theoretical conflicts of naturalistic and positivistic with Marxist and verstehen-oriented methodologists. This would suggest that the perennial problem about what ‘sociology’ is or might be is at root about what ‘meaning’ is or might be.

In this paper, we study the lower semilattice of NP-subspaces of both the standard polynomial time representation and the tally polynomial time representation of a countably infinite dimensional vector space V∞ over a finite field F. We show that for both the standard and tally representation of V∞, there exists polynomial time subspaces U and W such that U + V is not recursive. We also study the NP analogues of simple and maximal subspaces. We show that the existence of (...) P-simple and NP-maximal subspaces is oracle dependent in both the tally and standard representations of V∞. This contrasts with the case of sets, where the existence of NP-simple sets is oracle dependent but NP-maximal sets do not exist. We also extend many results of Nerode and Remmel concerning the relationship of P bases and NP-subspaces in the tally representation of V∞ to the standard representation of V∞. (shrink)

In responding to and examining Mary Anne Raywid's adoption of community building as an aim for schools, I survey a number of types of communities, including recreational, intentional and language communities. In considering all these communities, I try to show both the power of communities in our personal lives and some idea of why we might be of two minds about promoting community as an ideal in the modern world and in schools in particular.

While cetaceans clearly show social learning in a wide variety of contexts, to label this as hides more than it reveals: we need a taxonomy of culture to tease apart the differences rather than hiding them in a catch-all category.

During the past decade some of the most provocative and controversial disputes concerning the philosophy and history of science have centered about the work of Thomas Kuhn and Sir Karl Popper. One, therefore, looks with anticipation to this volume which is based on a symposium held in July, 1965 where Kuhn, Popper and several of Popper's former students met for an intellectual confrontation. But the result is depressing. The volume is an editorial mess. Two of the main scheduled speakers never (...) appeared at the symposium, although papers by them are published here. Some of the remarks published here seem to be those spoken on the day the symposium was held while others, like Kuhn's answer to his critics, were written four years after the symposium. The result is a confusing and distracting editorial unevenness. While Kuhn's fair-minded opening paper raises some of the most important issues to be confronted, one quickly senses that the Popperians are not really very much interested in discussing Kuhn's work but rather in pushing their own pet theses. Kuhn puts this rather generously when he labels it an example of "talking-through-each-other." Most of the Popperians seem to be obsessed with Kuhn's understanding of normal science and neglect the much more interesting questions concerning his views on scientific revolutions, the sense in which science does and does not make progress, the criteria involved in adjudicating among competing theories. It is almost with relief that one reads Margaret Masterman's remark that it is a "crashingly obvious fact" that there is normal science. Ironically, Masterman's article which is basically sympathetic to Kuhn's work is the most illuminating and the most critical. More successfully than any of other contributors she shows the ambiguities involved in Kuhn's idea of a paradigm. One's wishes that the Popperians would take a good hard look at themselves and what they are doing as it is so disastrously illustrated here. Although ostensibly dedicated to serious critical rationalism, they seem more eager to score points than to understand what they are criticizing. Although they supposedly abhor clubiness, they are rapidly forming themselves into a scholastic circle where the object seems to be to show how brilliant or how stupid some other student of Popper is. Although they scorn the quest for origins, they are almost compulsive in attempting to show that anything worthwhile was previously said by Sir Karl. This book illustrates the faults of the Popperians at their worst and few of their virtues. There is much heat and wit, but little light.--R. J. B. (shrink)

The key word in the title of this book is "essay," for Strawson has not written an introduction to Kant, nor a commentary on the Critique. It would be closer to truth to say that Strawson has attempted to extract and to translate into a contemporary idiom what he takes to be philosophically important in the Critique. Kant's major positive achievement, according to Strawson, is the partial carrying out of a certain program, viz., "that of determining the fundamental general structure (...) of any conception of experience such as we can make intelligible to ourselves." But this program can be dissociated from the Kantian motif that the structure of experience is "imposed by our capacities." Thus Strawson speaks of the "doctrinal fantasies of transcendental idealism." Given Strawson's concern with what he takes to be Kant's positive achievement, he doesn't hesitate to expose the weakness of some of Kant's arguments, to restate many of them in a more convincing way, or even to supply new arguments. But Strawson also exhibits a remarkable sensitivity to many recondite aspects of the Critique, e.g., the role of "pure intuition" in Kant's theory of geometry, and the status of "self-consciousness." The result of Strawson's essay is a philosophically exciting encounter where one can learn as much about Kant as he can about Strawson's own central concerns, and indeed about some of the most central issues of philosophy, both past and present.—R. J. B. (shrink)

In explicating the terms "Evangelical," "Catholic," and "Reformed," Vassady outlines what he thinks are the essential characteristics of any new Church communion. His analysis generally develops along classical or Neo-Orthodox Protestant lines, as is most obvious in his treatment of the apostolic succession of the episcopacy. The new Church will have a functional episcopacy but "without declaring any particular doctrine of the episcopacy." Given Vassady's theological leanings and conception of the Church, it is somewhat anomalous that he thinks organic unity (...) so highly desirable.—D. J. B. (shrink)

This is an exceptionally good introduction to a critical life of Jesus. The first chapters are filled with useful information about Hebrew life, culture, and legend. Connick is aware of the results of Form Criticism but adopts the more moderate position of Bornkamm. Numerous factors controlled the authenticity of the early traditions and prevented them from running rampant. In the discussion of miracles, the Virgin Birth, and the Resurrection, Connick attempts to deal with the multitude of objections which have been (...) raised against traditional beliefs. It is clear that he does not think that either Form Criticism or scientific materialism refute belief in supernatural events.—D. J. B. (shrink)

Starting from Plato's statement in the Seventh Letter that Plato never intended to write down his philosophy in systematic form, Sinaiko conceives of the dialogues as attempts to combine the power of the spoken word with the written word while avoiding the limitations of either. Dramatic form and philosophic content are interdependent. The three dialogues are interrogated for statements about dialectic, and each dialogue's account of dialectic is taken to be complete in itself. It is not simply a dialectical method (...) which Plato is using; Being itself is dialectical, and there is no final philosophical system but rather an "infinite multiplicity of systems." While it is certain that philosophy for Plato can not be separated from the activity of philosophizing, Sinaiko's claim is far more controversial: that each dialogue "sets forth a complete ontology, an entire philosophical system." One might well disagree with that contention and other more detailed points of interpretation. But Sinaiko's position is defended ably and his book has a philosophical vitality which sets it apart from the usual pedantic efforts to expose this or that Platonic argument.—D. J. B. (shrink)

Though the individual chapters appeared as essays in various journals, their cogency and urbane scholarship make them particularly noteworthy in book form. In the chapter "Social Problems in the Early Church" Ehrhardt suggests an important methodological principle: the history of theological development cannot ignore the social conditions of the little people who accepted the Christian message. The most demanding chapter of the book, "Creatio ex Nihilo," is also the most unsatisfactory. Ehrhardt has command of the historical sources, but his treatment (...) of the relevant philosophical problems is less than clear. It need only be added that the first chapter, "The Theology of New Testament Criticism" is a devastating attack on unenlightened faith.—D. J. B. (shrink)

Another textbook of traditional logic, subject to the characteristic limitations of that tradition. Propositional logic receives scant attention, and polyadic predicates are ignored. Propositions are in places confused with terms, as when the transitivity of implication is analyzed in terms of the Barbara syllogism. Although professedly Aristotelian, the treatment departs from Aristotle on a number of points: syllogisms are presented as inference rules rather than as logical theses; singular statements are assimilated to universal ones; and modal syllogisms are not covered. (...) Only about one-third of the book treats formal logic; the remainder includes discussion of basic semiotic, definition and division, induction, and fallacies, along with the rudiments of Thomistic epistemology and metaphysics.--J. B. B. (shrink)

This is a detailed commentary on Hume's first Inquiry. Flew argues, rightly, that it should not be treated simply as a weakened abridgement of part of the Treatise. He gives a great deal of the historical context in an interesting and helpful way, but he is primarily concerned to lay out and to assess Hume's arguments. Inevitably much of the book covers quite familiar ground, but in discussing Hume's arguments on miracles and on religion generally, Flew has a number of (...) new and suggestive points to make. The book as a whole will be useful for the student beginning the study of Hume, and Flew's criticisms, as well as his frequent review of other criticisms, should prove helpful to the advanced student. --J. B. S. (shrink)

Students of philosophy, East and West, will be benefited greatly by this reprint of Professor Raju's pioneering study of comparative philosophy, which is the outgrowth of a series of lectures presented in Saugor University during 1955. Even for comparative philosophy, man must be the leitmotif, the common denominator for analyzing and interpreting the diversity of philosophical traditions. In his attempt to contribute to the "sense of the basic oneness of humanity, the human solidarity in spite of differences," he interprets the (...) three great philosophical traditions in terms of their respective approaches to the inward and outward aspects of reality. The central meaning or thrust of these traditions is expressed in the titles of the major sections of the book: "Western philosophy and the struggle for the liberation of the outward," "Chinese philosophy and human mindfulness," and "Indian philosophy and explication of inwardness." Western philosophy accomplished primarily a "liberating of the object or outwardness from its entanglement with the subject or inwardness." Chinese philosophy, by trying to build an ethics and philosophy on the emotional rather than the rational nature of man, has struck an even balance between the extremes of inward and outward by establishing clear lines of relatedness between individual men, society, and nature. Indian philosophy has been characterized chiefly by a "reflective inwardness," an overriding concern for the nature of the ätman, the interrelationship between intellect and intuition and the way to ultimate liberation from the round of rebirth and redeath through the immediate, intuitive apprehension of the unity of all things. The final section is dedicated to a general overview of the three major traditions in which the author delineates some of the more obvious and central parallels and distinctions among them. While the book is filled with useful information, novices are sure to be misled and professionals disappointed by the attempts to reduce entire religio-philosophical traditions to a set of neat interpretative labels, such as: Judaism is ethical zeal, Christianity is neighborly love, Buddhism is compassion, Islam is social solidarity, and the Upanishads is divine communion.--J. B. L. (shrink)

The scholar who translated The Edicts of Ashoka into English has now set out to present and critically analyze some of "The Great Ideas of Indian Culture." While apparently engaging in a search for the ever-elusive "Perennial Philosophy" by invoking Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, et al., the author's comparative statements come off as being little more than decorative paraphernalia. He submits too completely to the mystique of the Socratic dialogue in claiming that "the outstanding characteristic of Indian thought is dialogue". (...) We can agree that one does find a type of verbal exchange which might merit the designation of "conversation," but not dialogue. At no place in either the Upanisads or Gïta does the student ever feel the slightest compulsion to question or contradict the words of his guru. Nikam also commits the grave philosophical indiscretion of using Platonic language about "universals" to speak of the Vedäntin "Universal Absolute,". This sort of cross-cultural comparison is extremely misleading in cases where the ideas being compared are similar or identical in appearance but dissimilar in substance. Even so, the book is extremely informative, and, in places, inspiring, in its illumination of the subtler dimensions of Indian thought. Western philosophers and interested lay-students should find this small volume most helpful in gaining a succinct but comprehensive presentation of the "Great Ideas of Indian Culture."--J. B. L. (shrink)